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The two-person, two-choice Prisoner’s Di-
lemma game offers the players an opportu-
nity to demonstrate either trust, by choosing
the cooperative (C) response, or suspicion,
by choosing the defection (D) response
(Deutsch, 1958). In the conventional ex-
perimental situation each of the players has
an opportunity to make only the completely
cooperative response or the completely de-
fecting response. Cooperative responses
when made by both players provide re-
wards to both. Defecting responses, if they
are mutual, are detrimental to both players.
The incentive to defect, however, derives
from the nature of payoffs following asym-
metrical choices by the pair members. When
one player defects (chooses D) unilaterally
while the second player chooses C, the de-
fector is most highly rewarded and to the
detriment of the cooperator. When the
game is played without communication,
rationality (in the strict sense of game
theory) provides no solution consistent with
the collective interests of the players.
The following example of a payoff matrix
for a Prisoner’s Dilemma game helps to
demonstrate the nature of the dilemma:
Player A’s Choices
C D
Player B’s C 20, 20 40, -20
Choices D -20, 40 0, 0
In repeated trials of a game of this kind,
a pair of players generally establishes a
stable relationship. This relationship is
characterized either by a lengthy succession
of mutually beneficial outcomes (CC) or by
a succession of mutually punishing or non-
rewarding outcomes (DD). There are, of
course, trials in which only one player tries
to cooperate while his partner defects and
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sources: National Science Foundation, grants
G 99 and GS 586; National Institutes of Health,
M-423801-02-03-04-05; and Sigma Xi, the Sci-
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gains at his expense. But the frequency of
such asymmetrical behavior declines after a
series of trials and pairs generally fall into
either the cooperative pattern or the non-
cooperative, from which they depart only
rarely (Rapoport, 1965; Pilisuk and Rapo-
port, 1963). The significance of this lock-in
phenomenon lies in the degree to which the
game presents a microsimulation of inter-
personal behavior. Two individuals are
obliged to make a series of behaviors which
affect their partner’s well-being as well as
their own. Eventually, large numbers of
these pairs develop a stable interaction pat-
tern which defines them as a social unit.
What characteristics distinguish a cooper-
ating pair of &dquo;Peace Doves&dquo; from a com-
peting pair of &dquo;War Hawks&dquo;? Are their
personalities different? Are the Doves in a
pair more like each other than the members
of Hawk pairs? Does the game environment,
aside from such obvious experimental ma-
nipulation as changing the payoff matrix,
affect the relative frequencies of Dove-like
or Hawk-like outcomes? And, perhaps of
greatest importance to the psychologist, is
there a pattern of early play, a system of
gestures and responses in the game itself,
which so teaches the lesson of cooperation
that it is productive of Doves rather than
of Hawks?
The game designed to answer these ques-
tions is more complex than the two-choice
game described previously. The new form
permits each player a range of moves in
every trial of the game so that his choice
is no longer constricted to total cooperation
or total defection but may vary from 0 to
20 units of cooperation, as may his partner’s
choice. The resultant 21 by 21 matrix of
possible outcomes is so fixed as to contain
the same basic paradox as the 2 by 2 game.
Like the 2 by 2 game, the newer design
produces its quota of Dove pairs, Hawk
pairs, and some intermediary (&dquo;Mugwump&dquo;)
pairs.
The difference is that the newer game
more closely approximates many actual
situations where the choice is not whether
to cooperate or not but rather what degree
of cooperation to choose. Also, a versatile
set of arms-race-simulating conditions, e.g.,
missile conversion, inspection, etc., are
easily fitted to the game (Pilisuk and Rapo-
port, 1964). And most important, the added
choice flexibility permits a more refined
study of gestures and responses which may
lead players to suspicion or to trust.
Method
A total of 128 male college students (64
pairs) participated as subjects in this study.
The experimental room contained booths
permitting up to three pairs of subjects to
participate simultaneously while completely
eliminating visual and verbal contact be-
tween pair members. Subjects who knew
one another prior to the experimental ses-
sion were not paired. Recruitment was from
volunteers for paid psychological experi-
ments.
Subjects first completed questionnaires
used to assess self-acceptance and monetary
risk performance. The characteristics of the
game were then described to them and play
began. Upon completion of games a brief
strategy questionnaire was used to obtain
subjective descriptions of strategies em-
ployed. After the experimental session was
completed, subjects were asked to take home
and complete the questionnaires which were
used to assess tolerance for ambiguity, in-
ternationalism, and social risk preference.
Upon receipt of completed take-home ques-
tionnaires, subjects were paid for their par-
ticipation in the experiment, in amounts
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corresponding to their actual achievements
in the game.2
When play began, the player sat facing
an 8&dquo; X 10&dquo; playing board divided into 20
squares. A two-faced poker chip, white on
one side, blue on the other, was on each
square. All twenty chips were placed white
side up at the start. Each player was also
given a full matrix of outcomes showing the
payoff to each player for every possible
combination of choices by himself and by
the other player. (A representation of this
matrix, reduced to 5 X 5, is presented in
Figure 1.) A play consisted of turning any
number of discs (from 0 to 20) from white
to blue.
The payoffs may be understood as reward-
ing each player one unit (2 monetary mills)
for each blue side he exposes. If both play-
ers expose an identical number of blue
tokens their payoffs are completely deter-
mined by this number. In the event of a
disparity between the players in the number
of blue chips exposed, the player showing
fewer blue chips is given an additional pay-
off equal to twice the size of the disparity.
For the player showing the larger number
of blue tokens an amount equal to twice the
disparity is subtracted from his total payoff.
If players A and B expose Bla and Bib blue
chips respectively and receive payoffs Pa a
and Pb respectively, then (1) Pa = 2Blb -
Bla and (2) Pb = 2Bla - Blb.
In other words, conversion to blue chips
is rewarding when mutual but punishing to
the degree that it is unilateral. Conversely,
retention of white chips is nonrewarding if
mutual, but rewarding to the extent that it
is unilateral. Specifically: (1) if both play-
2 The tolerance for ambiguity measure is a
six-point Likert-type scale containing the eigh-
teen items relating to preferences for regularity
or change, clarity or ambiguity, balance or
asymmetry, etc. Nine items were selected from
a pool of F scale correlate items which had been
classified by their authors as measures of toler-
ance for ambiguity (Webster et al., 1955). The
remaining nine items were taken from a mea-
sure of tolerance for ambiguity reported in a
study by O’Connor (1952). The F scale has
been shown to predict noncooperation in simple
non-zero-sum games. The authors suspected
the "cognitive style" aspect of authoritarianism
to be more relevant to game performance than
the affective or attitudinal components and se-
lected tolerance for ambiguity for measurement.
The self-acceptance measure was included in
the battery to test the notion that acceptance
of oneself might be instrumental to the develop-
ment of trust for a partner. People who are less
self-accepting tend also to be less accepting of
others (Berger, 1952) and, perhaps, less willing
to trust the other player in a non-zero-sum
game. Fifty items were selected randomly, one-
half of all those used in the Q-sort technique
reported in Rogers and Dymond (1954).
Actual discrepancies between self-image and
ideal image were used.
The internationalism scale contained items
from other attitude scales (Levinson, 1957;
Samson and Smith, 1957) combined and modi-
fied to produce a set of questions which the
authors felt might be appropriate for the popu-
lation at hand. (Copies of the scale are avail-
able on request.) Because internationalism was
shown to be related to non-zero-sum game be-
havior (Lutzker, 1960), we anticipated an even
greater effect upon game behavior in games
loaded with the semantic referents of the arms
race.
Since monetary rewards were used in the
game we felt that the individual’s propensity to
take risks might affect his play. Two measures
were used to assess an individual’s propensity
to take risks. The first, a gambling task involv-
ing real monetary rewards, was followed by a
task of social risk preference.
The monetary risk preference measure con-
sists of a set of choices among actual monetary
gambles which subjects make. (Copies are
available.) The measure of social risk-taking
was reported by Kogan and Wallach (1961).
It investigates the chances which people would
be willing to take in a series of life-like social
situations.
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Fic. 1. Reduced form of payoff matrix shown to players. The actual matrix used showed
all values from 0 to 20. The first figure in each box represents one’s own payoff; the second
figure, the payoff for the other player.
ers convert fully from white to blue chips,
both win 20 units; (2) if neither player
converts any tokens to their blue side, neither
receives any units; (3) complete unilateral
conversion to blue matched against an op-
posing player’s complete retention of white
results in a loss of 20 units to the cooperator
and a gain of 40 units to the defector; and
(4) payoffs between these extremes are de-
termined by both the number of blue chips
one exposes and the difference between that
number and the number exposed by the
other player. The extreme outcomes are
identical to those shown in the illustrative
two-choice payoff matrix given earlier. Some
intermediate outcomes appear in Figure 1.
The game was played in two experimental
settings, the abstract and the simulated.
Sixty-four players, one-half the total, played
only abstract games. The other half played
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simulated games exclusively. The abstract
game has already been described. In it the
tokens on the game board are merely tokens,
i.e., poker chips which were blue on one
side and white on the other. Instructions
avoided such evaluative words as &dquo;coopera-
tion or competition,&dquo; &dquo;winning or losing,&dquo;
&dquo;contest,&dquo; &dquo;opponent,&dquo; and even &dquo;game.&dquo;
While these words were also omitted in the
simulated condition, a new set of evaluative
symbols was used. The simulated game was
introduced with the terminology of an arms-
race-disarmament dilemma. A token with
its white side showing was referred to as a
weapon and contained a schematic picture
of a missile upon it. Blue-side-up tokens
were called economic units and contained
schematic pictures of factories. A game
board was a country. The simulated condi-
tion was intended to heighten the game’s
similarity to the arms race without express-
ing preference for either armament or dis-
armament.
Payoffs were identical in abstract and
simulated conditions. After each play of the
55 plays of the game, a player was informed
of his partner’s choice by receipt of a note
from the experimenter. From this he could
refer to his matrix and keep informed of his
payoffs.
The second experimental variation in-
volved the manner in which players made
their decision as to how far to cooperate or
disarm, i.e., how many tokens to turn from
white to blue. In the short game which has
already been described, each player makes
a single move converting from zero to
twenty of his tokens. The single moves by
the two players determine the payoffs to
each and terminate that trial or play of the
game.
The long game consisted of twenty sepa-
rate moves. On a given move, white chips
could be converted to blue, or blue chips
could be converted back to white, provided
only that a player might never turn more
than two chips on any given move. No
feedback was given prior to the twentieth
(last) move. Since the intermediate moves
of each player had no effect upon payoffs
and were not made known to the other
participant, the long game appears identi-
cal with the short. In fact, the long and
short games are logically isomorphic. How-
ever, they may differ psychologically. Forc-
ing players to enact their final decision in
gradual steps could alter the decision.
All subjects played 40 short and 15 long
games. Half of the subjects began with 40
short games and then played 15 long games.
The other half reversed this order. A block
design of the experimental variation is
shown here:
Abstract Simulated
Long First Al Sl
Short First A2 S2
Results3
A. SELECTION OF CRITERION PAIRS
The data deal with characteristics of three
types of pairs. The pairs were classified
into discrete categories in accordance with
the performance of both players during the
last five games in an experimental session
containing 55 games. The pair labels are
Dove ( cooperators ) , Hawk (noncoopera-
tors), and Mugwump (intermediate). A
pair was labeled Dove if (1) both players
turned 15 or more of their tokens from
white to blue during each one of the last
3 Results contained here deal exclusively with
the differentiation between criterion groups
designated by performance during the last five
plays of the game. The effects of experimental
conditions on such gross indices of behavior as
the average number of tokens turned over in
all trials are discussed in Pilisuk and Rapoport
(1963).
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five games and (2) neither player turned
over fewer than 17 tokens per trial, on an
average, over these same trials. The Hawk
criteria are completely symmetrical. A Hawk
pair was so designated where (1) neither
player turned more than 5 tokens to their
blue side during the last five trials and (2)
neither player turned over an average of
three tokens or more per trial during these
same games. The third and intermediate
group, Mugwumps, contains all the remain-
ing pairs which failed to meet the conditions
for classification as either Dove or Hawk.
The grouping provides 26 pairs of Doves,
17 pairs of Hawks, and 21 Mugwump pairs.
These criterion groups were used for the
remainder of the analysis. The groupings,
while arbitrary, provide for stringent differ-
entiation between the cooperators (Doves)
and the noncooperators (Hawks). (The
probability that two players, making random
choices, will fall into one of these two
groups is less than 10-b. ) Some Mugwump
pairs, however, were apparently moving
toward greater cooperation during the final
five trials and might have met the Dove
criterion had the experiment continued be-
yond 55 trials. Some Mugwumps, on the
other hand, were showing essentially non-
cooperative behavior but not quite to the
Hawk criterion. Even among the more
homogeneous Dove and Hawk groups, pair
histories display some interesting differences
as well as similarities. For example, by
applying the five-trial block criterion to
trials earlier than the last five it is possible
to split the Dove pairs into early and later
cooperators. And it is possible to identify,
among both Hawks and Doves, some few
pairs who met the criterion and then lost it.
By the end of an hour and a half of game
play, however, the Doves were locked into
the pattern of mutual cooperation, the
Hawks were locked into a conflict of dis-
trust, and the Mugwumps had achieved
neither of these stable patterns.
B. THE INFLUENCE OF PERSONALITY
VARIABLES
Five personality variables were assessed.
They were: (1) self-acceptance; (2) mone-
tary risk preference; (3) tolerance for
ambiguity; (4) internationalism; and (5) so-
cial risk preference. A brief rationale for the
selection of these variables has been given
in footnote 2.
We asked two questions about the dif-
ferences in the personalities of the Doves,
Hawks, and Mugwumps. First, we asked:
Do the individual Doves, Hawks, and Mug-
wumps differ on the dimensions of personal-
ity we thought relevant to game behavior?
That is, is the average Dove (or Hawk or
Mugwump) different from members of the
other two groups? Second, we asked: Do
pair members among Dove, Hawk, or Mug-
wump pairs differ in the extent to which
they are similar to their partners? The im-
port of the second question may be seen
in two variants of it. Do members of a pair
of Doves resemble one another more closely
or less closely than members of a typical
Hawk or Mugwump pair? And does the
instability of the Mugwumps’ resolution
reflect a greater personality disparity be-
tween partners than might be found among
either Doves or Hawks?
Mean scores on each of the five individual
difference measures are contrasted for
Doves, Hawks, and Mugwumps in Table 1.
Examination of the differences between
means on each variable presents a consistent
and negative picture. The F values are not
statistically significant. The variables se-
lected here do not predict well to criterion
group performance. With the possible ex-
ception of tolerance for ambiguity, which
may favor the potential for achievement of
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TABLE 1
PERSONALITY DIFFERENCES AMONG DOVES, HAWKS, AND MUGWUMPS
a Low scores indicate greater self-acceptance.
b Low scores indicate greater tolerance for ambiguity.
the Dove group criterion, there is little even
to suggest that personality characteristics
might be exerting a noticeable influence.
This may appear in some contrast to the
work of Deutsch (1960b) and Lutzker
(1960) in the simpler two-choice games,
but it must be recalled that they used total
cooperation by an individual over all trials
of a game.4 Here, in addition to using a
more complex game, the prediction is to
the terminal behavior of the pair of players.5
One negative finding which calls for special
note is that internationalism scores did not
predict significantly to criterion groups, even
for those experimental groups playing under
the simulated arms-race-disarmament con-
dition. One highly intemationalistic sub-
ject, an active advocate of disarmament and
other liberal causes, displayed game be-
havior which was filled with unpredictable
treachery and rearmament, at his opponent’s
expense. His comments on this performance
were that while he felt he ought to move
toward disarmament he also felt, at the
same time, the challenge of the game. The
opportunity he perceived to make a killing
was too great.
In one sense, it is not surprising that in-
dividual difference variables predict poorly
to game outcomes. The very fact that
Prisoner’s Dilemma games so frequently
result in &dquo;lock-ins&dquo; of either cooperation or
noncooperation attests to the fact that ran-
domly matched personalities do come to
resemble one another in performance.
Such results suggest that individual per-
sonality has little effect on game behavior
but do not rule out the possibility that
personality characteristics of the pair, the
match of traits between partners, may be
effective. After all, the fact that diverse
players come to resemble one another in
game behavior does not explain why the
resemblance is in cooperative (Dove-type)
behavior in some cases and in much more
competitive (Hawk-type) behavior in others.
Similarity scores for a pair were obtained,
using all personality measures in combina-
tion. Each measure was divided into thirds
of high, medium, and low scores. When
members of a pair both fell into the same
third a score of 2 was entered, adjacent
4 Actually the experimental situations are not
strictly comparable. Deutsch predicted to the
Prisoner’s Dilemma game played once. Lutz-
ker’s payoff matrix presents the subject with an
essentially different problem&mdash;the game of
"chicken" rather than the Prisoner’s Dilemma
game. The two games are related, but in
"chicken" unilateral cooperation is more re-
warding than mutual defection and the motives
for noncooperation are thus altered. The matrix
shown on p. 491 above would be a "chicken"
matrix if ( 0, 0 ) were changed to, say, (-25, -25).
5 Prediction from personality measures to
gross levels of cooperation was only slightly




PERSONALITY SIMILARITY OF DOVES, HAWKS,
AND MUGWUMPS.
4 Entries are percentages over rows. Numbers in
parenthesis are frequencies.
thirds were scored 1, and extreme thirds
were scored 0. Summed over five variables
this produced a possible range of similarity
scores from 10 (very similar) to 0 (very
dissimilar). Table 2 compares the more
similar pairs (scores of 6 or more) with
the less similar pairs (scores of 5 or less).
The data, again, show nothing of statisti-
cal significance and hardly anything in
trends worthy of further examination. Re-
finement of similarity indices using actual
numerical discrepancies and correcting for
small intercorrelations among the separate
measures would obviously contribute little
to understanding why some pairs become
Doves, others Hawks, and others Mug-
wumps.
One single personality variable seemed to
offer better differentiation of criterion groups
than did the five-test battery. Pair members
who were bath high on tolerance for am-
biguity were more likely to become Doves
than were pairs lower on this variable (p <
0.01). Pair scores in tolerance for ambi-
guity are shown related to criterion groups
in Table 3.
C. THE INFLUENCE OF THE
EXPERIMENTAL SETTING
There were four experimental groups, as
shown in the block design (see above, p.
495). Two groups, Al and A2, played
TABLE 3
COMPARISON OF DOVE PAIRS HIGH OR Low ON
TOLERANCE FOR AMBIGUITY WITH COMBINED
HAWK AND MUGWUMP PAIRS
x2: 16.00 p < 0.01
NOTE: Actual frequencies are given in parenthesis. N
for this table is 45, i.e., 19 Dove pairs and 26
Hawk and Mugwump pairs. Pairs receiving
Hi-Lo or Med-Med ratings are excluded from
this analysis.
only abstract games. Groups S, and S2
played only the simulated arms-race games.
Groups Al and S, each started with fifteen
long games followed by forty short games,
whereas in groups A2 and S2 the forty
short games came first. The number of pairs
of Doves (cooperators), Hawks (defectors),
and Mugwumps (in-betweens) in each of
the four conditions is given in Table 4.
The findings in Table 4 can be sum-
marized, but certain interactions between
the effects of the two experimental condi-
tions are difficult to interpret. A comparison
of the conditions Al and Sl (long first) with
the As and S2 (short first) conditions in
both the abstract and simulated forms would
tend to indicate that playing the long game
first produces more Doves relative to the
proportion of Hawks and Mugwumps. This
long-short difference tends, however, to be
muted in the simulated (SI and S2) condi-
tions. Hence, simulation makes the likeli-
hood of becoming Doves or Mugwumps
more nearly equal in the long-first and
short-first conditions. However, the likeli-
hood of becoming Hawks, while favored by
the short-first conditions, shows this effect
most markedly under simulated conditions.
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TABLE 4
THE EFFECT OF EXPERIMENTAL VARIATIONS ON FORMATION OF CRITERION GROUPS
X (total) 15.22; p < 0.06 (df: 2); X~ ( interaction ) 5.77; p < 0.05 (df: 2).
Arms-race labels, then, seem to be of sec-
ondary import and seem not to exert inde-
pendent effects upon criterion groups. The
labels do, however, show some effects in
interaction with the other experimental
condition.
The apparent conduciveness of long-first
conditions Al and SI to the production of
cooperating Doves may be seen in Table 5,
which contrasts all long-first games with all
short-first games.
This comparison shows, rather clearly,
that partners who started by playing the
slower long games and then switched to the
rapid short ones were quite likely to turn
into cooperating Doves. Conversely, those
who began with the rapid short games were
more likely to turn into either the undis-
tinguished Mugwumps or the uncooperative
Hawks. Whether this distinction is a func-
tion of boredom and/or need for activity is
not known. Certainly, in starting from a
fully armed position, twenty separate op-
portunities to do something-in this case,
to disarm-may be mcre difficult to resist
than a single opportunity. Full control of
this &dquo;mechanical&dquo; feature would require a
reversal of the game with the initial level
being the disarmed state. At this point,
another hunch is that a cognitive reappraisal
process quite apart from boredom is operat-
ing to induce cooperation (see discussion
below).
When all players of abstract games are
compared with all players in the arms-race-
simulating games, the insignificance of
simulation stands out clearly (see Table 6).
Abstract games produce the same number
of Doves, of Hawks, and of Mugwumps as
do simulated games. In terms of final out-
come for the pair, arms-race labels appar-
ently make no difference.
One might argue that the absence of
effects of the arms-race label should be
expected, because the label does not affect
the strategic structure of the game. How-
ever, the long and the short versions of the
game are also strategically equivalent. Yet
pronounced differences are observed in the
two versions. Why? The authors suspect
that something in the protracted nature of
the long game permits more time for cogni-
tive reappraisal of alternatives. Some yet
unpublished results suggest that when the
&dquo;player&dquo; is actually a team of three persons,
a period of communication within the team
(but not between teams) increases coopera-
tion (Martin, 1964). Perhaps time favors
such reappraisal by giving the individual
player more chance to discuss alternatives
with himself. Once begun, the rewards of
the cooperative path tend to be reinforcing
and self-perpetuating even if a switch is
made to the short game.
D. EARLY DIFFERENCES IN PLAY
Criterion groups were distinguished, orig-
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TABLE 5
THE EFFECT OF LENGTH OF INITIAL 15 GAMES ON FORMATION OF CRITERION GROUPS
X2: 9.34; p < 0.01 (df: 2).
in ally, by their performance on the last five
of 55 consecutive games. Early experience
in each of these criterion groups is defined
by pair behavior during the first five games,
in particular, but also by pair behavior in
games six through ten.
Three measures of early game behavior
were used: ( 1 ) cooperativeness, measured
by the number of tokens turned from white
to blue-the greater the number, the more
cooperative; (2) cooperative gesture, de-
fined as a play of the game in which a
player converts 10 or more tokens, one-half
or more of his total, from white to blue (in
any given trial there may be a cooperative
gesture by both, by one, or by neither
player); (3) discrepant outcome, defined as
a game in which one player converts five
or more tokens from white to blue in excess
of the number turned by his partner. The
significance of discrepant outcomes, as a
measure, is that they indicate an experience
in which one player has gained at the other’s
expense. It means that one player on that
trial was, unilaterally, cooperating more
than his adversary. Over a period of five
trials it is possible for both players to have
both experiences-being at the short end
and at the long end of the discrepant out-
come. It is also possible that only one player
experiences the short end; or discrepant
outcomes may have been totally absent.
D-1. Some indicators of cooperativeness
in early play. First let us consider each
token turned from white to blue, from
missile to factory, during any block of five
trials of the game, to be a cumulative index
of the cooperation achieved by that pair:
i.e., the greater the number turned, the
more the cooperation. Then, separating the
Doves, Hawks, and Mugwumps according
to their eventual performance as before, we
find some very early differentiation between
groups. During the first five trials the
average Dove converted 8.5 tokens per
game, the average Hawk 4.8 tokens, and the
average Mugwump 4.2. (The Hawk-Mug-
wump difference is not statistically signifi-
cant. ) Fuller data are shown in Table 7.
The amount of cooperation for each of
the three criterion groups may be calculated
for every block of five nonoverlapping trials,
as shown in Figure 2.
The Dove group clearly retains its dis-
TABLE 6
THE EFFECT OF ABSTRACTNESS ON FORMATION OF CRITERION GROUPS
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TABLE 7
COOPERATIVENESS IN EARLY GAMES
tinctiveness from the others. The Hawk
group establishes itself below the Mug-
wumps on the seventh trial and remains
there through all remaining trials. In sum,
then, our findings show that Doves start
higher on the cooperativeness index and
ascend rapidly. Hawks start lower and de-
cline, while Mugwumps start lower and
ascend slowly.
The very fact that lock-ins (of Dove-like
cooperation or Hawk-like defection) do
occur suggests a degree to which partners
come to play like each other. But how alike
were partners during the first five games?
Some insight into this question is given by
calculating the performance of Dove mem-
bers from each Dove pair who cooperated
less than their partners. Average coopera-
tion for the more niggardly Doves was 6.6
tokens per games (first five games). This
still exceeds the average Hawk player’s 4.8
tokens and even exceeds the average of the
more cooperative member of each Hawk
pair, which was 5.6 tokens.
The finding suggests that the relatively
high level of early cooperation by those who
later proved themselves to be Doves was
not the result of a single player extending
himself unilaterally. However, other find-
ings reopen the question. If we examine the
case in which one and only one player con-
verted more than 50 percent of his tokens
from white to blue (disarmament), we find
that 10 out of 26 Dove pairs met this crite-
rion over the first five games. Meanwhile,
only two out of 17 Hawk pairs and two out
of 21 Mugwump pairs showed one and only
FIG. 2. Comparison of time courses of co-
operative moves between three criterion groups
distinguished by pair performances on the last
five trials.
one member cooperating more than halfway.
Again, if we examine the instances in
which a disparity of 25 or more tokens (an
average of five tokens or more per game)
occurred over the first five games, the same
pattern emerges. Seven out of 26 Dove
pairs showed this disparity. However, only
two out of 17 Hawk pairs and three out of
21 Mugwump pairs showed this disparity.
Obviously this does not resolve the case for
or against the usefulness of early unilateral
efforts in predicting ultimate criterion
groups. But it does suggest the need for a
finer analysis of game-by-game play, and
such an analysis follows.
D-2. Early cooperative gestures as pre-
dictors of terminal pair performances. The
data on cooperative gestures, converting 10
or more of one’s white or weapon tokens to
blue, are given in Figures 3 through 5.
Certain patterns emerge. First, if a pair
had even a single early experience of mutual
cooperation, i.e., both making cooperative
gestures on the same trial, that pair was
likely to become a Dove pair.
Second, we observe that instances of
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FIG. 3. Percentage of pairs showing at least
one mutual cooperative gesture. D: Doves;
H: Hawks; M: Mugwumps.
simultaneous gestures of cooperation were
relatively infrequent during early play. The
occurrence of unilateral gestures was more
frequent among each of the three criterion
groups.
Third, few of the Mugwump pairs were
making cooperative gestures during the first
five trials. The situation changed in the
second five trials. Here numerous Mug-
wump pairs showed such gestures. But-
as may be seen in Table 8-the gestures
were not made simultaneously and, in fact,
they tended to be made by only one player
during the entire block of trials. By con-
trast, individual Hawks extended unilateral
gestures of cooperation more often in the
very first five trials. But, faced with non-
reciprocation, these gestures became much
less frequent in the second block of five
trials. In sharp contrast, both members. of
FiG. 4. Percentage of pairs showing at least
one unilateral cooperative gesture.
FIG. 5. Percentage of pairs showing ( four
or more) mutual noncooperative gestures. Use
of four or more as an index reflects an approxi-
mate median split.
Dove pairs tended to extend gestures during
early play. In fact, by the second block of
five trials those Dove pairs which were not
demonstrating cooperative gestures by both
members were likely to be demonstrating
few unilateral gestures either. Some Dove
pairs apparently showed mutual willingness
to cooperate from the start. The other Dove
pairs were apparently more like the Hawks
than like the Mugwumps in their early play.
This can be seen also in Table 8, which
shows that both Dove and Hawk groups
increased their frequency of mutually non-
cooperative, armed gestures from the first
to the second block of five trials, while
Mugwumps reduced their frequency of
mutual defection.
D-3. Early discrepant outcomes as pre-
dictors of terminal pair performance. A
discrepant outcome, as noted earlier, means
that one player has suffered and the other
has benefited during a trial. What does such
an experience do to the pair’s future? Dis-
crepant outcomes occurred in almost all pairs.
Figure 6 compares the instances in which
such outcomes were repeated (occurred at
least twice within a block of five trials).
During the first five trials, significantly
more Doves than Hawks or Mugwumps
experienced two or more discrepant out-
comes. However, by the second block of five
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TABLE 8
EFFECT OF RECIPROCATION OF COOPERATIVE GESTURES ON FOR112ATION OF CRITERION GROUPS
NOTE: Figures given are for the occurrence of a single incident. None = mutual non-cooperative or armed ges-
ture.
trials the Dove pairs were performing most
congruently, showing fewest discrepant out-
comes. Only the Mugwumps increased their
frequency of discrepant outcomes during
trials six through ten. This finding lends
support to a conjecture introduced earlier-
that even before the lock-in occurs, Dove
and Hawk pairs tend to be moving toward
greater symmetry (or sensitivity) in play
than is true for the Mugwumps.
Figure 6 does not indicate whether the
repeated occurrences of discrepant outcomes
always favored the same player or whether
both players had the experience of being
FiG. 6. Percentage of pairs showing re-
peated (two or more) discrepant outcomes.
both victor and vanquished. Table 9 con-
trasts relative frequencies with which the
discrepant experiences were reciprocal, uni-
directional, or entirely absent for the three
criterion groups.
During the first five games, only the Dove
pairs showed a high frequency of cases in
which both players experienced the discrep-
ancy from both directions. By the second
block of five trials, the Doves and the Hawks
showed the greatest number of pairs with no
discrepant outcomes at all. The Mugwump
pairs were still showing discrepancies during
those trials. The data suggest that early
experience of the good (and bad) effects of
incongruent performance is an indication
of future Dove-like cooperation-if each
player has had a taste of the medicine of
being caught disarmed and an opportunity
of seeing the other player cooperate more
than himself.
Discussion and Conclusions
The terminal states of Dove, Hawk, and
Mugwump may be viewed as products of
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TABLE 9
RECIPROCATION OF DISCREPANT OUTCOMES AND THE FORMATION OF CRITERION GROUPS
the forces that bring individuals into social
units which are either cohesive and facilita-
tive, or divisive and despairing, or uncertain
and unstable. Evidence from this experiment
suggests that the locus of these forces lies
primarily in the circumstances of the inter-
action rather than in such characteristics as
personality traits brought to the situation.
In addition, the early trials of interaction,
like the early years, may have enduring ef-
fects upon later behavior.
From analysis of early interaction it seems
clear that the interaction pattern which in-
duces mutual cooperation is a two-party
affair. For lasting cooperation, parties to a
conflict situation do have to make overtures,
for that is-in the last analysis-all they can
do. But what also seems necessary is that
cooperative gestures of the other are met
with similar responses on one’s own part at
early stages in the conflict process.
Gestures of cooperation, whether or not
they are defined as we have done here, are
clearly both causes and effects of game per-
formance. Our examination of the result of
natural game conditions indicates that
a unilateral initiative toward coopera-
tion, if not quickly reciprocated (i.e., if it
remains unilateral), does not lead to the
development of a cooperative pair. On the
other hand someone must initiate cooperative
play, and it is relatively rare, in the absence
of overt communication, that both players do
this simultaneously. The findings on cooper-
ative gestures (Table 8) and discrepant out-
comes (Table 9) suggest that both unilateral
and reciprocal elements are important in
game performance. Their relative impor-
tance, however, would seem to be most read-
ily determinable in a more structured exper-
imental situation with stooges or a false feed-
back procedure.
At some point in the sequential moves
and countermoves of a conflict situation it
seems likely that a person takes cognizance
of the intent which the other player is trying
to communicate (or perhaps communicating
without trying) through his moves. One
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subject, for example, offered the following
comment after the experiment: &dquo;At first I
thought he [the other player] was stupid
letting me win like that. But after a while
I saw that he was trying to get me to turn
over more factories so we could both win.&dquo;
Obviously, there was a cost involved here
in the signaling of intent. The authors are
currently working on a modification of the
game which permits signals of intention, in
the form of inspections, without cost to
either player.
The realization that behavior can be used
to communicate one’s hopes and expectations
and threats to the other player raises the
contest from what may be viewed initially
as a game against nature, a game in which
the other’s moves are only partly predictable
and wholly out of reach of one’s influence.
A second realization, however, seems even
more critical for enduring cooperation in a
pair. It is the experience that both oneself
and the other party are really part of the
same system, unified by a common fate, and
no longer independent decision-makers.
Viewed from this perspective, the game does
have a rational or strategic resolution which
is easily found: cooperate fully on every
trial. We have numerous instances of such
comments as: &dquo;I could see from the start
that turning them all over was the only thing
for us to do.&dquo; This perception of &dquo;we&dquo; or
&dquo;us&dquo; is clearest if we look at some comments
of Dove pairs whose cooperation came late
and who played more like Hawks at the be-
ginning. &dquo;I could see at this point that we
were both in a rut and weren’t going any-
place.&dquo; The data we have showing more
frequent early instances of mutual coopera-
tive gestures by Dove pairs or more frequent
reversing of roles in the case of discrepant
outcomes suggest the very conditions which
might teach the lesson of interdependence
and common destiny.
Why a pair of potential antagonists seems
better able to learn this during an early run
of protracted decision games (long games)
than during an equivalent run of short games
is not entirely clear. At this point, our best
guess seems to be that slowing the pace of
the decision process, before the pattern of
play has settled, enhances the opportunity
for players to recast their concept of the
conflict situation. Such cognitive recasting
could then produce the realization that (1)
communication through behavior is occur-
ring, or (2) the two parties are really part
of the same system, or both. From among
five individual difference measures, only
mutual tolerance for ambiguity seemed rele-
vant to arriving at mutual cooperation. The
ability to reframe old perceptions is a part
of tolerance for ambiguity. The finding
would seem consistent with the conclusion
that a cognitive recasting which occurs
during the moves and countermoves of an
interpersonal conflict is necessary for the
self-organization of the two parties into a
single cohesive unit.
The most remarkable thing about the
Hawks as a group is that they hardly ever
tried to cooperate. Following a few unilat-
eral and unreciprocated gestures at the very
beginning, the frequency of cooperative ges-
tures (either unilateral or reciprocal) be-
comes so low that one might conclude that
one reason why Hawks never learned to co-
operate is because they never experimented
with or explored the communication channels
that the game was structured to provide.
One cannot say of them, as a group, that
they are more deceitful or treacherous or
aggressively competitive players. On the
basis of game performance, what stands out
is their conservatism, caution, and reluctance
to try a new approach. This observation is
also supported by the fact that the one per-
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sonality indicator that did predict to game
outcomes was tolerance for ambiguity. Play-
ers who were less tolerant of ambiguity
seemed unwilling to explore the various
potentials in the game situation.
In contrast, the Doves as a group were
experimenting with cooperation from the
start. Some tried and succeeded early, others
failed but tried again later and were success-
ful. Some of them use, and some of them
report, interesting strategies of rewards and
punishments intended to lure the other
player toward mutual trust. The description
of such strategies and the search for their
determinants and their consequences make
an intriguing problem for future research.
The Mugwump pairs probably represent
several entities. Some may have contained
a member who never changed his initial per-
ception that success in the game depended
solely upon outsmarting one’s partner.
Others may have rejected the formation of
a predictable social unit because of fasci-
nation with gamesmanship-much like the
Don Juans who enjoy the hunt but cannot
stay with the marriage. One might argue
that all individuals faced with sustained in-
teraction do eventually develop stable and
reciprocal behavior patterns-but our exper-
iments were continued through only 55
trials.
We have stressed in our conclusions the
theme that reciprocal behaviors at an early
stage of the interaction process are of major
importance in the development of later trust,
and that personality indicators seem less
relevant. Two alternative theories are
brought to the fore by this. The first says
that circumstances of play alone determine
the resolution of conflict. By chance, this
theory would state, certain moves made by
one party meet moves made by the other,
and the distribution of these random pairings
provides the starting point for stochastic
processes (probabilities of performance con-
tingent on the prior happenings) which lead
to the final outcomes.
The alternate theory is not that the player’s
cooperation is a product of some inherent
propensity, a personal proclivity which he
carries about either to cooperate or not. The
extremely high correlation of cooperation
rates found between randomly matched pair
members seems adquate for rejection of such
a theory. But the alternative to the random-
start, stochastic-interaction theory is the
view that players do bring to the game set-
ting certain proclivities, not to act in a cer-
tain way, but rather to react in certain ways
to the contingent circumstances presented
by the other player’s behavior. To test this
latter theory one will have to think of person-
ality traits as contingent reaction propensi-
ties ; measure these propensities; and study
their effects upon experimentally arranged
contingencies of opponent’s behavior. This is
an important task for future research. What
our present research has done is to help
crystallize these alternative theories re-
garding the ways in which interaction syn-
thesizes individuals into social units.
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